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Abstract
In this paper we investigate how restrictions for emission trading to the energy-intensive
power sector will affect the magnitude and distribution of abatement costs across EU
countries vis-à-vis a comprehensive EU emission trading regime. We find that emission
trading between European power sectors allows the harvest of a major part of the
efficiency gains provided by full trade as compared to strictly domestic action. However,
trade restrictions may create a more unequal distribution of abatement costs across member
states than is the case for a comprehensive trade regime. The reason for this is that
restricted permit trade enhances the secondary terms-of-trade benefits to EU member
countries with low marginal abatement costs at the expense of the other EU member states.
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1 Introduction
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union committed itself to reducing its emission of
greenhouse gases by 8% during the period 2008-2012 as compared to 1990 emission
levels. Cost-effectiveness considerations suggest that marginal abatement costs across the
different emission sources should be equalized. This could be achieved at the international
level by a system of tradable emission permits. However, the scope and institutional design
of a tradable permit system is highly disputed among signatory parties of the Kyoto
Protocol (see e.g.  Oberthür and  Ott 1999). Reservations against unrestricted emission
trading range from concerns on environmental effectiveness to ethically founded
arguments that industrialized countries try " to cheaply buy themselves out". The EU
shares some of these reservations but insists at the same time that  intra-EU emission
trading should be considered as domestic action and not as international emission trading -
the latter being yet undefined and unapproved under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. The
latest European Commission's Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading within
the European Union promotes intra-EU emission trading as a key instrument for reaching
the aggregate EU target in a cost-effective way (COM 2000). In the run-up of the Kyoto
budget period, the EU contemplates on commencing an internal emission trading scheme
by 2005. With respect to the scope of an EU emission trading system, the EU considers
starting with a relatively small number of economic sectors that contribute significantly to
total emissions and exhibit larger differences in marginal abatement costs.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         3
In this context, we analyze the economic implications of industry-level emission trading
within the EU. The prime candidate for restricted industry-level trading is the electricity
sector which - according to the most recent  Business-as-Usual ( BaU) projections ( EiE
1999) - will continue to account for roughly a third of the overall EU carbon emissions and
more than 70% of the industry's total emissions. We compare the magnitude and
distribution of efficiency gains from permit trading across EU electricity sectors with the
no-trade case in which EU member countries meet their Kyoto targets through strictly
domestic action. In addition, we supplement information about the extent to which EU-
wide industry-level emission trading within the electricity sector reduces potential
efficiency gains that accrue from full trade of emission permits within the EU. As to
industry-level emission trading we distinguish two sub-cases. One, in which emission
rights are handed out for free to the power producers in their countries, and one, in which
permits are auctioned to the power producers by the respective governments.
The key insights from our analysis can be summarized as follows:
 (i) Emission trading at the level of the European power industry, where permits are
auctioned by the respective governments, reduces EU-wide costs of meeting the Kyoto
targets through strictly domestic action by about 20%. This corresponds to roughly half of
the cost savings achievable through a comprehensive permit trading system.
(ii)  Grandfathering permits instead of auctioning them has important efficiency
implications. When permits are given away to power producers at no charge on the
condition that the additional income is used to support production, efficiency gains fromIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         4
industrial permit trade nearly vanish. The reason for this is that grandfathered permits work
as distortionary subsidies on the output side.  Grandfathered permits yield the smallest
adverse effects on the electricity sectors, with power generation exceeding even BaU levels
for most countries. The latter could provide an incentive for the European power industry
to act as a first mover on the basis of grandfathered permits.
 (iii) While all other EU member states face welfare losses, Austria, France, and Germany
benefit from emission constraints under the Kyoto Protocol. As these countries have
relatively low effective reduction targets, they gain competitiveness over other EU
countries that face much higher emission constraints: The implied change in the terms of
trade more than offsets their domestic abatement costs.
(iv) Full trade in permit rights does not provide a Pareto-improvement as compared to the
no-trade case. Austria, France, and Germany suffer from terms-of-trade losses when
abatement costs get equalized across regions which dominate their primary gains from
emission sales. On the other hand, restricted emission trading across EU power sectors
makes Austria, Germany, and France better off than they would be in the no-trade case:
EU-wide trade in the electricity sector still leaves huge differentials in the marginal
abatement costs of the non-electric sectors across EU countries. Austria, France, and
Germany, then, further experience gains in competitiveness, i.e. secondary terms-of-trade
benefits, while making additional income from sales of permits on the electricity market.
Our insights emerge from numerical simulations with a large-scale CGE model for the
world economy. The model developed not only incorporates all EU member countries, butIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         5
also other Annex-B parties as well as major non-Annex-B regions. With its regional
disaggregation outside the EU, the model accounts for important changes on international
prices and trade flows triggered by the emission abatement of Annex-B parties outside the
EU. Apart from the detailed regional breakdown of the EU, another novelty of our model
is the incorporation of most recent information on future trends of the energy systems and
economic growth for individual EU countries based on comprehensive research undertaken
by the European Commission (EiE 1999).
Our analysis complements a recent study commissioned by the EU on the economic effects
of alternative trading schemes (Capros and Mantzos 2000). This study - based on a partial
equilibrium bottom-up model for the European energy system - identifies a similar order of
magnitude for the EU-wide costs of complying with the Kyoto targets under alternative
trading regimes. However, our results differ significantly from Capros and Mantzos with
respect to the distributional consequences of emission trading. The partial equilibrium
approach does not account for income effects due to shifts in the terms of trade, which may
account for a larger part of the total economic effect a country faces from multilateral
carbon abatement policies. Moreover, we show that alternative ways of recycling permit
rents may have important implications on the economy-wide efficiency of abatement
strategies.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we give a brief model summary,
motivate the importance of the  BaU calibration, and describe the steps involved in theIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         6
parameterization of our analytical framework. In section 3 we present our scenarios and
interpret the computational results. In section 4 we summarize.
2 Analytical Model and Baseline Calibration
For our analysis, we use a general equilibrium model of the world economy featuring 7
sectors (5 of which are energy sectors) and 23 regions (15 of which are EU member states).
The choice of sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of carbon abatement such as
differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability across energy goods and
carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The regional aggregation covers the Annex-B parties
as well as major non-Annex-B regions which are central to the greenhouse gas issue. Table
1 summarizes the sectors and regions incorporated in the model.
The functional forms and key model assumptions are standard within the CGE approach to
carbon abatement policy analysis (see e.g. Böhringer 2000). A detailed algebraic summary
of the generic model is given in the Appendix.
The costs of complying with Kyoto depend crucially on the extent to which the emission
reduction commitments bind economies in the budget period between 2008 and 2012. The
expected magnitude of abatement costs is directly linked to the structural characteristics of
each particular economy exhibited in the  BaU situation without exogenous emission
constraints. For example, higher economic growth in the baseline will - ceteris paribus -
result in increased  BaU emissions that imply higher compliance costs with the Kyoto
targets. On the other hand, energy efficiency improvements allow  decoupling economicIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         7
growth from emission increase. The specific differences in economic development may
either reduce or enlarge the cross-country differences with respect to the effective
reduction requirement under the Kyoto Protocol. These differences are an important
determinant for the shifts in comparative advantage, which translate into secondary
burdens or benefits from carbon abatement via changes in international prices (terms-of-
trade effects).
To summarize, BaU projections have a major influence on the magnitude and distribution
of abatement costs and hence deserve careful analysis when real policy conclusions should
be drawn.
For the baseline parametrization of our model, we have harmonized most recent economic
and energy flow information from different sources. The first step has been the
construction of a consistent benchmark data set for the year 1995 using:
•  GTAP4 ( McDougall,  Elbehri, and  Truong, 1998): GTAP currently includes input-
output tables for 50 sectors in 45 regions with bilateral trade flows for 1995.
•  EUROSTAT (Beutel 1999): EUROSTAT provides input-output tables with 25 sectors
for all EU member countries in 1995.
•  IEA energy balances and energy prices/taxes (IEA 1999): IEA reports physical energy
flows and energy prices for industrial and household demands in a time series
until1998.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         8
•  CHELEM (WEFA 1998): The CHELEM database supplies harmonized accounts on
bilateral trade between countries.
A shortcoming of GTAP4, with respect to EU policy analysis, is the missing full
disaggregation of the European Union (GTAP4 explicitly represents Germany, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom - all other EU member countries are
summarized in an aggregate Rest of EU). We employ EUROSTAT and CHELEM in order
to disaggregate the composite EU region within GTAP, so that we ultimately have all
individual EU countries represented. The IEA data is used twofold in the construction of
the benchmark data set: (i) EUROSTAT has summarized all energy translated transactions
within one single energy branch. However, the analysis of carbon abatement policies
requires the representation of alternative energy carriers. Based on physical energy flows
and respective energy prices, we split down the aggregate EUROSTAT energy sector into
five subsectors: COL, GAS, CRU, OIL, and ELE; (ii) we do a "bottom-up" calibration of
energy demands and supplies for the updated GTAP dataset in order to obtain sector-
specific and energy-specific emission coefficients. Finally, we use the  reconciliated
benchmark data for 1995 to calibrate parameters of the CES functional forms from a given
set of quantities and prices.
The second step of the  parametrization involves a forward calibration of the 1995
economies to the year 2010. Here, we incorporate exogenous information from two
sources:Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         9
•  DOE (Department of Energy 1999): The U.S. Department of Energy gives information
on GDP growth, energy demand, energy supply, and future energy prices for various
countries and world regions.
•  EiE (Energy in Europe 1999):  EiE provides detailed information on the future
development of the European energy system and economic growth for all individual
EU member states.
We replace the DOE projections which are given only for the whole of Europe with the
detailed baselines at the member state level as given in EiE. The model is then calibrated to
exogenous information on non-uniform growth rates in GDP, fossil fuel production, fuel
mixes in electricity generation, changes in world market energy prices, and CO2 emission
profiles (see Böhringer, Jensen and Rutherford 2000 for a detailed description of related
calibration techniques). AEEI
1 factors are used to match energy demands by consumers
and production activities to fossil fuel supplies, i.e. carbon emission projections. It should
be noted, that the prospects for decoupling economic growth and carbon emissions for the
European Union are on average much more optimistic in the EiE perspective than in the
DOE view. Despite of lower average GDP growth rates between 1995 and 2010 (2.2% per
year (DOE) versus 2.5% per year ( EiE)) DOE projects significantly higher carbon
emissions for the whole of the EU (3.75 billion tons of CO2 as compared to 3.3 billion tons
                                                
1 Autonomous energy efficiency improvement is due to autonomous technical progress in
addition to energy demand reductions that are caused by increases in energy prices.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         10
by EiE). The EiE assumptions on fuel re-shifting towards renewables and large efficiency
improvements account for these differences.
Table 2 provides a summary of historic and future aggregate carbon emissions across
countries to which the model has been calibrated. The emission projections in 2010 yield
the effective reduction requirements individual parties face under the Kyoto requirement.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, we
assume implementation of the six-gas burden sharing agreement for CO2 only.
The effective reduction requirements across Annex B countries in 2010 are very different
from the nominal Kyoto commitments based on 1990 emission levels. For example, the
USA, which committed itself to a 7% reduction target with respect to the 1990 level, faces
an effective cutback requirement of nearly 30% as compared to the 2010 BaU level. On the
other hand, regions like EIT and FSU will stay well below their 1990 emission levels due
to structural breaks in economic activities. As to the European Union, the aggregate
nominal EU target of 8.6% comes down to an effective target of 14.2%.
Apart from matching the model at the regional level to the emission projections provided
in Table 2, we also calibrate functional forms for power production, i. e. the energy mix in
electricity generation, to reproduce the BaU emissions from power generations in 2010
according to the specific  EiE forecasts (EiE 1999, pp. 188-217). The latter calibration
provides us with the energy experts' starting point for analyzing the implications of EU-
wide carbon emission trading across the electricity sectors. Table 3 summarizes theIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         11
projected demands of fossil fuels and the implicit carbon emissions to which our model has
been calibrated under BaU.
3 Policy Scenarios and Numerical Results
3.1 Policy Scenarios
In our numerical simulations we distinguish four scenarios. We start with a scenario NTR
in which all Annex-B countries meet their Kyoto targets through domestic action only: The
governments set domestic emission taxes sufficiently high to meet the national reduction
targets.
2 The NTR simulation delivers a benchmark for the magnitude and distribution of
efficiency gains emerging from cross-country flexibility of emission abatement within the
EU. The natural counterpart to the NTR case is the scenario  TRD, in which emission
permits can be traded across all sectors and EU member states: Equalization of marginal
abatement costs across all emission sources implies a cost-efficient solution with respect to
the overall EU reduction target, if we abstract from transaction costs and the possibility of
extra-EU emission trading. We can then measure to what extent the EU forgoes potential
                                                
2  Likewise, the government could auction emission permits within domestic borders,
aligning the total amount of auctioned permits with its domestic Kyoto emission
reduction target.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         12
efficiency gains from restricting intra-EU permit trade to the electricity sector.
3 Restriction
of emission trading to some sectors poses the question of how many emission rights should
be allocated to these sectors. For our simulations of emission trading across EU electricity
sectors, we adopt the following rule: Each EU country splits up its emission endowments
given by the EU burden sharing agreement according to the reduction of emissions in the
NTR case.
4 In other words: the national government sets aside emission rights for the
electricity sector which are equal to the emissions generated by power producers in the
NTR case. Industry-level emission trading allows the EU power industry to identify the
least-cost emission abatement solution within the European electricity sector. At the same
time, each national government must assure that the other sectors in the economy do not
overuse the remaining emission rights (i.e. the Kyoto entitlements reduced by the permits
allocated to the electricity sector). In our simulations, all other non-electric sectors in the
economy are subject to a carbon tax which is set sufficiently high to keep with the
remaining emission budget. With respect to electricity-level emission trading, we
distinguish two cases: The scenario ELE_AP reflects a setting in which the government
auctions permits to the power industry; the scenario ELE_GP considers a setting where
                                                
3 Under implementation considerations, the excess costs of restricting trade provides an
upper bound for the transaction costs that arise from an extension of the permit trading
system.
4 Note that the allocation of emissions in the NTR case represents an efficient outcome if
only domestic action is permissible.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         13
emission rights are given away at no charge to the electricity sector (grandfathering).
Throughout the simulations, we assume that revenues from the application of carbon taxes
or the introduction of emission permits are recycled lump-sum to the representative
consumer. The one exception - as just noted - is the scenario ELE_GP, in which some
fixed amount of emission rights are handed out for free to the power sector. Table 4
summarizes the main characteristics of the abatement scenarios described above.
3.2 Results
Table 5 summarizes the welfare effects across the alternative emission abatement scenarios
reduction that are measured as percentage changes in real consumption in comparison to
the baseline. These relative changes are translated in total compliance costs in billions of
ECU95 as given in Table 6. Table 7 indicates the marginal abatement costs for the different
scenarios, and Table 8 reports the quantities of traded emissions for the respective
scenarios. Note that the label EUR is used in the tables below to denote the economic
effects at the aggregate EU level (see also Table 1), whereas the label OTH subsumes all
non-EU regions.
Our interpretation of results starts with the no-trade case NTR in which Annex-B countries
impose domestic carbon taxes which are sufficiently high in order to meet their respective
Kyoto target. Not surprisingly, those regions (EUR, USA, JPN, OOE) that face a binding
emission constraint in 2010 bear adjustment costs towards less carbon-intensive
consumption and production patterns. Among OECD countries, the EU faces by far theIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         14
lowest costs. The main reason is that - based on our official projections - its effective
aggregate reduction requirement is much lower than those of USA, JPN and OOE.
Carbon abatement in large open economies may produce substantial spillovers on trading
countries due to the implied changes in international prices, particularly on world markets
for fossil fuels. We can directly monitor these spillovers for regions that do not have to
implement abatement measures.
5 Among Annex-B regions, EIT and FSU have abundant
carbon emission rights, but they are nevertheless affected in different ways by abatement in
the OECD countries. While EIT faces a secondary benefit, FSU suffers from a secondary
loss. The primary explanation is that EIT, as a large fuel importer, benefits from falling
world market prices of fuels (as a consequence of decreased world demand) whereas FSU,
as a fuel exporter, faces a revenue loss. The same reasoning applies for fuel exporting
MPC. The terms-of-trade effects on fossil fuel markets may be strengthened or weakened
by shifts in comparative advantage on non-fossil fuel markets depending on a country's
initial trade relations and the effective carbon tax. ROW, e.g., will suffer income losses
with respect to its fossil fuel exports. However, these losses are more than offset by
additional income from increased world market shares in trade of non-energy goods
associated with its energy cost advantage as compared to OECD countries.
                                                
5 F or a straightforward decomposition of the total general equilibrium effect into a
domestic market effect keeping international prices constant and an international market
effect that accounts for terms-of-trade effects see Böhringer and Rutherford 1999.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         15
When we focus on the economic implications at the EU country level, we observe that
some countries may gain rather than lose from carbon abatement. Again, the differences in
reduction requirements and terms-of-trade effects account for this result: Due to low
effective reduction targets, AUT, DEU, and FRA face low marginal abatement costs. As
compared to other EU trading partners they can levy much lower carbon taxes and
therefore experience a cost advantage in energy-intensive production. Table 9 illustrates
the induced shift in comparative advantage for energy-intensive goods. While average EU
production in energy-intensive goods declines, AUT, DEU, and FRA, significantly
increase their production.
The cost advantage for low tax countries AUT, DEU, and FRA, more than offsets their
costs from domestic emission abatement. DNK, FIN, GRC, NET, and PRT, at the other
end, face rather high effective reduction targets accompanied by substantial adjustment
costs.
Full emission trading within the EU bubble cuts down compliance costs by nearly 40%,
while the spillovers of this regime change outside the EU are negligible. Permit trade
within the EU has important implications not only for the total costs of EU abatement, but
also for the implied changes in the distribution of costs as compared to the NTR case. First
of all, the range in burden across EU countries shrink. In other words: The allocation of
efficiency gains via the market supports a more "equitable" outcome in terms of percentage
welfare loss (see Table 5). Countries like DNK, FIN, GRC, IRE, PRT, IRE, and NET can
significantly reduce their compliance costs by buying cheaper abatement from abroad. DueIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         16
to terms-of-trade effects, not all countries will necessarily gain from permit trade. In fact,
AUT, DEU, and FRA suffer from a terms-of-trade loss as compared to NTR. Their gains in
competitiveness with respect to energy-intensive production vanishes with equalized
marginal abatement costs across EU countries which is not offset by permit sales.
How will the magnitude and the distribution of abatement costs change when we restrict
intra-EU permit trade to the electricity industry? For ELE_AP, where emission permits are
auctioned by the respective governments to the power sector, the aggregate efficiency
gains as compared to the full-trade case drop by half. Although this loss appears
substantial, one could argue that emission trading between EU power generators only
brings in 50% of the efficiency gains from unrestricted permit trade. From an
implementing point of view, the extension of permit trade to sectors where the operation of
a permit system can become much more costly does not warrant large additional economic
gains. Another interesting result is that AUT, DEU, and FRA actually would prefer
restricted trade between power producers over both the full-trade scenario TRD and the no-
trade scenario NTR. The reasoning behind this is that trade across the EU power industry
still provides significant differences in marginal abatement costs for the non-electric
sectors such that AUT, DEU, and FRA further experience gains in comparative advantage
due to their low abatement costs (as compared to TRD) and make additional income from
permit sales in the European electricity market (as compared to NTR). The terms-of-trade
gains for AUT, DEU, and FRA work at the expense of the other EU countries whose
welfare gains from full trade are substantially reduced under ELE-AP.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         17
If the national governments give away permits to the power sector rather than selling them,
the aggregate EU efficiency gains fall close to zero as power producers use the additional
income to lower electricity prices and mitigate adverse adjustment effects of carbon
abatement on power production.  Grandfathered permits, then, work as implicit output
subsidies which cause efficiency losses due to the implied distortions in the allocation of
production resources (see Böhringer, Ferris and Rutherford 1998). As can be seen from
Table 10, grandfathering further reduces negative effects on power production and even
implies significant positive output changes as compared to the baseline for various EU
countries. While grandfathering can not be defended on efficiency grounds, it significantly
reduces the dispersion of production changes in power industries across the EU countries.
Finally, note that there is an important interaction between the distribution of permit rents
and the permit price itself. Implicit subsidies to the power producers under ELE_GP lead
to lower relative prices for emission-intensive electricity generation which, in turn, creates
higher demands and higher permit prices (see Table 7 for the associated difference in
equalized marginal abatement costs between ELE_AP and ELE_GP).
4 Conclusions
In wake of the forthcoming Kyoto budget period 2008-2012, the EU is contemplating
commencement of an emission trading scheme within the Community by 2005. One major
question to be resolved is the  sectoral scope of an  intra-EU emission trading system.
Considering that transaction costs of an emission trading system may quickly increase withIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         18
the number of economic sectors involved, a reasonable approach is to include only a small
number of sectors that contribute significantly to total emissions and exhibit larger
differences in marginal abatement costs.
In this paper, we have analyzed the economic implications of restricting emission trading
to the EU power sectors as compared to unrestricted trade as well as strictly domestic
action. We find that industry-level emission trading among EU power producers already
yields a large share of potential efficiency gains from full trade. However, this results only
holds if permits are auctioned to the electricity sector and not given away for free. In the
latter case, the gains from equalization of marginal abatement costs across power
producers get absorbed up from economy-wide efficiency losses due to the implicit
subsidies for the electricity sectors.
With respect to cost distribution, the transition from purely domestic action to a
comprehensive trading system does not provide a Pareto-improvement because countries
with low marginal abatement costs may lose initial cost advantages (terms-of-trade gains)
under the no-trade case that are not offset by additional income from permit sales. On the
other hand, comprehensive trade reduces the dispersion of welfare costs across EU
countries which may be interpreted as a shift towards more "equitable" burden sharing.
Restriction of permit trade which may be defeated on transaction costs grounds can run
cross equity considerations as it accentuates the relative gains for low tax countries even
more at the expense of other countries.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         19
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OIL Refined oil products
ELE Electricity
EUR European Union: AUT-Austria, BEL-
Belgium, DEU-Germany, DNK-Denmark,
FIN-Finland, FRA-France GRC-Greece,
GBR-United Kingdom, IRE-Ireland, ITA-
Italy, LUX-Luxemburg, NET-Netherlands,
PRT-Portugal, SPN-Spain, SWE-Sweden
EIS Energy-intensive sectors CIN China and India
Y Manufactures and services EIT Economies in Transition
FSU Former Soviet Union
MPC Mexico and OPEC
OOE Other OECD (Australia, Canada and New
Zealand)
JPN Japan
ROW Rest of World
USA United StatesIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         22
Table 2: Carbon emissions and reduction requirements (EiE 1999)
Carbon emissions in million tons CO2 Reduction requirements in %
1990 2010 Nominal wrt 1990 Effective wrt 2010
EUR 3097.3 3299.4 8.6 14.2
AUT 56.2 54.8 13.0 10.8
BEL 104.3 124.0 7.5 22.2
DEU 948.2 827.0 21.0 9.4
DNK 50.2 54.9 21.0 27.8
FIN 53.1 73.6 0 27.9
FRA 369.8 389.5 0 5.1
GBR 559.6 572.2 12.5 14.4
GRC 65.6 109.6 -25.0 25.2
IRE 29.7 42.8 -13.0 21.6
ITA 385.4 429.8 6.5 16.2
LUX 9.3 8.9 28.0 24.4
NET 166.1 206.7 6.0 24.5
PRT 41.8 67.1 -27.0 20.9
SPN 206.6 274.4 -15.0 13.4
SWE 51.3 64.0 -4.0 16.6
EIT 1103.7 967.9 7.0 -6.0
FSU 3707.0 2669.3 0 -38.9
JPN 1004.7 1213.7 6.0 22.2
OOE 795.7 1044.9 0.6 24.3
USA 4931.7 6541.2 7.0 29.9
CIN 2834.3 6753.8 - -
MPC 1034.0 1660.9 - -
ROW 2445.7 4773.9 - -Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         23
Table 3: Fossil fuel demands and emissions in the power sector in 2010 (EiE 1999)
Coal (in Mtoe) Gas (in Mtoe) Oil (in Mtoe) CO2 (in Mtons)
EUR 137 166.5 83.6 1202.3
AUT 0.3 3.9 0.9 13.5
BEL 1.1 7.3 2.4 29.9
DEU 59 24.5 14.7 343.5
DNK 4.3 2.8 1.6 28.4
FIN 7.6 2.9 1.1 40.9
FRA 4.1 10 9.5 69.4
GBR 16.7 42.6 13.8 208.3
GRC 8.9 2.9 3.8 55.6
IRE 1.8 3.3 0.8 17.6
ITA 8.9 32.9 16.4 163.7
LUX 0.5 1.3
NET 5 16.8 6.6 78.3
PRT 4.2 4 1.6 31.1
SPN 13.6 10.1 8.2 103
SWE 1.5 2 2.2 17.9Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         24
Table 4: Overview of scenarios
Scenario Abatement regime applying within
EU-15
Abatement regime for non-EU Annex-B
regions
NTR No trade in emission rights across
EU countries, domestic emission tax
TRD Full trade of emission permits across
all EU member states, auctioned
permits
ELE_AP Electricity-level EU emission
trading together with target-
compatible domestic carbon taxes
for the remaining sectors; auctioned
permits allocated to electricity sector
correspond to the sector's respective
emissions in the no-trade case
ELE_GP Electricity-level EU emission
trading together with target-
compatible domestic carbon taxes
for the remaining sectors;
grandfathered permits allocated to
electricity sector correspond to its
respective emissions in the no trade
case
Compliance with Kyoto through
domestic emission taxIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         25
Table 5: Welfare costs  (% change in consumption from BaU)
NTR TRD ELE_AP ELE_GP
EUR -0.102 -0.065 -0.082 -0.098
AUT 0.369 0.360 0.381 0.349
BEL -0.160 -0.057 -0.156 -0.179
DEU 0.095 0.066 0.116 0.091
DNK -0.704 -0.412 -0.548 -0.550
FIN -0.878 -0.427 -0.788 -0.942
FRA 0.057 -0.021 0.063 0.070
GBR -0.137 -0.120 -0.138 -0.194
GRC -0.822 -0.285 -0.647 -0.697
IRE -0.523 -0.239 -0.461 -0.491
ITA -0.122 -0.066 -0.114 -0.098
LUX -0.893 -0.597 -0.896 -0.873
NET -0.970 -0.515 -0.888 -0.904
PRT -0.458 -0.169 -0.411 -0.377
SPN -0.084 -0.097 -0.089 -0.061
SWE -0.396 -0.378 -0.404 -0.430
OTH -0.459 -0.458 -0.458 -0.457
EIT 0.435 0.432 0.429 0.425
FSU -0.250 -0.261 -0.242 -0.245
JPN -0.339 -0.340 -0.340 -0.340
OOE -1.019 -1.012 -1.014 -1.012
USA -0.769 -0.768 -0.769 -0.768
CIN -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.019
MPC -0.899 -0.891 -0.893 -0.895
ROW 0.387 0.383 0.384 0.389Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         26
Table 6: Total compliance costs (in billion ECU95) annually between 2008-2012
NTR TRD ELE_AP ELE_GP
EUR 9.5 6.0 7.7 9.1
AUT -12.2 -11.9 -12.6 -11.6
BEL 5.7 2.0 5.5 6.3
DEU -33.0 -22.9 -40.2 -31.6
DNK 17.5 10.2 13.6 13.7
FIN 17.3 8.4 15.5 18.5
FRA -11.3 4.3 -12.5 -13.8
GBR 24.5 21.6 24.8 34.7
GRC 17.1 5.9 13.4 14.5
IRE 6.1 2.8 5.4 5.7
ITA 18.9 10.3 17.6 15.1
LUX 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.3
NET 42.0 22.3 38.4 39.1
PRT 9.5 3.5 8.5 7.8
SPN 7.6 8.9 8.1 5.5
SWE 12.9 12.3 13.1 14.0
OTH 109.2 109.1 109.1 108.7
EIT -26.2 -26.1 -25.9 -25.7
FSU 17.3 18.1 16.8 17.0
JPN 187.2 187.8 187.7 187.7
OOE 248.7 246.8 247.5 247.0
USA 891.1 890.2 891.0 889.2
CIN 5.4 5.4 5.6 4.2
MPC 293.4 290.8 291.6 292.2
ROW -188.2 -186.2 -186.7 -189.4Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         27
Table 7:  Marginal abatment costs in ECU95 per ton of CO2









AUT 41 118 72 44 105 35
BEL 163 118 72 162 105 151
DEU 71 118 72 80 105 52
DNK 355 118 72 228 105 176
FIN 346 118 72 289 105 257
FRAU 52 118 72 55 105 45
GBR 135 118 72 133 105 109
GRC 249 118 72 223 105 193
IRE 288 118 72 234 105 194
ITA 148 118 72 144 105 117
LUX 166 118 72 166 105 162
NET 234 118 72 222 105 202
PRT 187 118 72 183 105 163
SPN 115 118 72 115 105 98
SWE 134 118 72 132 105 120
EIT -- -- -- --
FSU -- -- -- --
JPN 271 271 271 270
OOE 186 185 185 184
USA 283 283 283 282Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         28
Table 8: Emission exports in million tons of CO2 annually between 2008 and 2012
TRD ELE_AP ELE_GP
AUT 7.0 1.4 1.5
BEL -6.3 -1.2 -1.1
DEU 43.7 28.1 30.1
DNK -6.0 -4.7 -4.7
FIN -11.8 -7.3 -6.8
FRAU 35.4 8.8 11.8
GBR -8.0 -1.8 -0.3
GRC -11.6 -7.8 -9.8
IRE -4.4 -2.5 -2.7
ITA -11.6 -3.8 -7.2
LUX -0.5 -0.1 0.0
NET -21.8 -8.6 -10.4
PRT -4.8 -2.3 -2.6
SPN 1.4 1.9 1.5
SWE -0.8 -0.1 0.7Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         29
Table 9: Energy-intensive production (% change from BaU)
NTR TRD ELE_AP ELE_GP
AUT 7.0 1.5 4.5 3.8
DEU 5.4 2.1 3.7 3.7
FRA 6.4 2.7 5.6 3.8
EUR -4.8 -2.0 -3.6 -2.2Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         30
Table 10: Production in electricity sector (% change from BaU)
NTR TRD ELE_AP ELE_GP
AUT 2.8 3.1 0.3 3.1
BEL -3.3 -1.6 -1.5 2.8
DEU -0.9 -1.8 -3.3 1.6
DNK -17.3 -8.7 -6.0 -1.1
FIN -7.5 -1.6 1.3 4.6
FRA 1.1 2.2 0.2 1.3
GBR -0.1 -0.1 0.1 4.5
GRC -21.2 -11.2 -10.5 -1.6
IRE -10.4 -5.4 -1.4 4.4
ITA -3.4 -2.5 -2.2 4.3
LUX -0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
NET -12.9 -6.2 -5.2 1.7
PRT -10.7 -6.6 -6.6 0.2
SPN -3.5 -3.7 -4.2 2.2
SWE 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.6Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         31
Appendix A: Algebraic Appendix
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for our
comparative-static model. The model has been designed to investigate the economic
implications of alternative EU emission abatement strategies under the Kyoto Protocol.
Before presenting the algebraic exposition we state our main assumptions and introduce
the notation.
Nested separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions characterize the use of
inputs in production. All production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. Goods are
produced with capital, labor, energy and material (KLEM).
A representative agent in each region is endowed with three primary factors: natural
resources (used for fossil fuel production), labor and capital. The representative agent
maximizes utility from consumption of an CES composite which combines demands for
energy and non-energy commodities. Supplies of labor, capital and natural resources are
exogenous. Labor and capital are mobile within domestic borders but cannot move
between regions; natural resources are sector specific.
All goods are traded internationally and differentiated by region of origin ( Armington
1969).Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         32
Lump sum transfers of the representative agent finance the exogenous government
demands in each region and the government transfers all revenues from carbon taxes or
auctioned carbon permits to the representative agent.
Two classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium for our model: zero
profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity
levels and the latter determines price levels. In our algebraic exposition, the notation 
z
ir P  is
used to denote the profit function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned to the
associated production activity. Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and
output prices provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Shepard’s lemma),
which subsequently appear in the market clearance conditions. We use i (aliased with j) as
index for commodities (sectors), r (aliased with s) as index for regions and d as index for
the demand category (d=Y: intermediate demand, d=C: private household demand, d=G:
investment demand, d=I: investment demand). The label EG represents the set of energy
goods and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels. Tables A.1 – A.6 explain the
notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition.Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         33
A.1 Zero Profit Conditions
1. Production of goods except for fossil fuels:
( ) FF i 0
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2. Production of fossil fuels:
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3. Energy aggregate (except for electricity sector):





















































￿ - + - +
-





} , , { } , , {
1
1 1
) 1 ( ) 1 (
3. Energy aggregate for electricity sector:
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5. Aggregate imports across import regions:
0
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7. Public good production:
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13. Output for domestic markets:
p  
 




































  A   =   M
¶





  G  
  p
 
  I   +  
p  
 
  C   +  
p   
 






































r jr jr r r r r
C
r r B I p G p CO t Q q +   K   v   +   L   w   =   p C ￿
˛
+ - - + 2
2












r r G   =   G
20. Investment:














A   = CO
¶
P ¶ ￿ ￿Industry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         37
Table A.1: Sets
i Sectors and goods
j Aliased with i
r Regions
s Aliased with r
EG Energy goods except for crude oil: coal, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: coal, crude oil and gas
LQ Liquid fuels: refined oil and gas
d Demand categories: Y = intermediate, C = household, G = government, and I = investment
Table A.2: Activity variables
ir Y Production in sector i and region r
ir E Aggregate energy input in sector i and region r
ir M Aggregate imports of good i and region r
dir A Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i in region r
r I Aggregate investment in region r
r G Aggregate public output in region r
r C Aggregate household consumption in region r
Cr E Aggregate household energy consumption in region rIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         38
Table A.3: Price variables
pir




























Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region r
r pl Wage rate in region r
r pk Price of capital services in region r
ir pq Rent to natural resources in region r (i ˛ FF)
2 CO
r t Price of CO2 permit in region rIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         39
Table A.4: Cost shares
jir q Share of intermediate good j in total costs of sector i and region r (iˇFF)
KLE
ir q Share of KLE aggregate in total costs of sector i and region r (iˇFF)
KL
ir q Share of labor in KL aggregate of sector i and region r (iˇFF)
E
ir q Share of energy in the KLE aggregate of sector i and region r (iˇFF)
Q
ir q Share of natural resources in sector i of region r (i˛FF)
FF
Tir q Share of good j (T=j) or labor (T=L) in sector i and region r (i˛FF)
q
COA
ir Share of coal in non-electric energy demand by sector i in region r (iˇFF)
q
ELE
ir Share of electricity in energy demand by sector i in region r
jir b Share of fossil fuel j in fuel compositedemand by sector i in region r (iˇFF)
q
M
isr Share of imports of good i from region s to region r
q
A
dir Share of domestic variety i in Armington aggregate for demand category d in region r
q
I
ir Share of good i in investment for region r
q
G
r Share of good i in government demand in region r
q
E
Cr Share of energy in aggregate household consumption in region r
ir g Share of non-energy good i in non-energy household consumption demand in region r
q
E
r C ELE , ,
Share of electricity in aggregate household energy consumption in region r
q
E
iCr Share of non-electric energy good i in the non-electric household energy consumption in
region rIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         40
Table A.5: Endowments and emissions coefficients
Lr Aggregate labor endowment for region r
r K Aggregate capital endowment for region r
ir Q Endowment of natural resource i for region r (i˛FF)
r G Aggregate government demand in region r
I r Aggregate investment demand in region r




Endowment of carbon emission rights in region r
carb
dir a Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i (i˛FF) in demand category d of region rIndustry-Level Emission Trading in the EU         41
Table A.6: Elasticities
KL s Substitution between capital and labor in production 0.5
KLE s Substitution between energy and value-added in production 0.3
ELE s Substitution between electricity and the non-electric energy
composite in production
1
COA s Substitution between coal and the non-coal fossil fuel composite in
production (except fossil fuels)
0.5
FF s Substitution between natural resources and other inputs in fossil fuel




M s Substitution between imports from different regions 8
A s Substitution between the import aggregate and the domestic input 4
EC s Substitution between energy goods in household energy
consumption
0.5